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CONSTITUTIONAL CROSSROADS:
RECONCILING THE TWENTY-FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
TO EVALUATE STATE REGULATION OF
INTERSTATE COMMERCE IN ALCOHOLIC
BEVERAGES
DUNCAN BAIRD DOUGLASS
INTRODUCTION
Trying to purchase a highly rated, limited-production wine1 from
a local wine retailer can be a fruitless endeavor. In most states, wine
retailers are permitted to purchase stock only from a state-licensed
wholesaler. If a licensed wholesaler does not carry the particular label
a customer desires, the customer will find it difficult or impossible
even to special order the wine through a local retailer. Growth in
mail-order and electronic commerce, however, has provided new
channels through which consumers and producers or retailers can
reach each other. The wine industry, particularly small wineries and
specialty wine retailers, has made swift use of these burgeoning ave-
nues of commerce. Many wineries and wine retailers permit custom-
ers to order coveted bottles of wine over the Internet through their
websites. Some oenophiles may be concerned that wines purchased
through mail-order or over the Internet will suffer poor travel or
storage conditions in the hands of common carriers during the neces-
sary shipping. A Florida resident who purchases wine from an out-of-
1. While the analysis and arguments presented in this Note apply equally to all types of
alcoholic beverages, the rapid growth in small wineries, the increased access consumers have to
the wines produced by small wineries through mail-order and the Internet, and the growing
popularity of limited-production wines make this segment of the liquor industry a particularly
strong case study for examining the intersection of old interpretations of the Twenty-first
Amendment, modern avenues of interstate commerce, and state liquor laws.
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state producer or retailer, however, should be far more concerned
about avoiding a prison sentence. Florida is one of a number of states
that have made it a felony for out-of-state sellers to ship alcoholic
beverages to unlicensed residents and for unlicensed residents to re-
ceive alcoholic beverages shipped by out-of-state sellers.2 Thirty states
outlaw the direct shipment of alcoholic beverages;3 six of these states
make it a felony.4
The Twenty-first Amendment is known best for what it accom-
plished in its first section, repealing the Eighteenth Amendment and
ending national Prohibition.5 Section two of the Amendment, how-
ever, has been much more important and controversial. Without sec-
tion two, ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment in 1933 would
have simply and clearly returned commerce in alcoholic beverages to
its pre-Prohibition, unfettered status. Instead, section two of the
Amendment prohibits the transportation or importation of alcoholic
beverages in violation of state law.6 This peculiar constitutional provi-
2. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 561.54, 562.23 (West 1999). Section 561.54 criminalizes direct
shipment of alcoholic beverages from a location outside of the state of Florida to an unlicensed
person in the state and makes repeat offenses a felony. Section 562.23 makes all parties who
conspire to do an act which violates any provision of the state alcoholic beverage law, including
section 561.54, guilty of a crime of the same degree as the section of the beverage code violated.
Thus, an individual in the state of Florida who places an order to have wine shipped directly
from an out-of-state location to that person’s home may be guilty of conspiring to violate sec-
tion 561.54, the second violation of which is a third-degree felony.
3. See Ron Eckstein, Grapes of Wrath: Vintners Draw E-Commerce Lobby into a Fight
Over Online Wine Sales by Warning that Pending Bill Portends Wider Internet Regulation,
LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999, at 1. State laws proscribing direct shipment of alcoholic beverages
generally prohibit one or both of the following activities: 1) the shipment of alcoholic beverages
generally, or wine specifically, from any out-of-state producer, retailer, or other person for de-
livery to any unlicensed person in the state, or 2) the importation of alcoholic beverages into the
state by an unlicensed resident, although some states permit in-person transportation of limited
quantities of alcoholic beverages into the state. See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
4. Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, North Carolina, and Tennessee have enacted
felony direct-shipment laws. See infra note 136.
5. The Eighteenth Amendment, added to the Constitution in 1919, substantively provides:
“After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the
United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby
prohibited.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. Section one
of the Twenty-first Amendment, ratified in 1933, provides that “[t]he eighteenth article of
amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.” U.S. CONST. amend.
XXI, § 1.
6. The text of section two of the Twenty-first Amendment provides: “The transportation
or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
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sion, which seems to afford explicit constitutional protection to state
regulation of trade in alcoholic beverages, led Laurence Tribe to note
sardonically that carrying an alcoholic beverage across a state line in
violation of the state’s liquor laws is one of only two ways that a pri-
vate individual, not acting under color of state law, can violate the
Constitution; the other way is to enslave a person.7
Following its ratification, states were quick to rely on the
Twenty-first Amendment in establishing a three-tiered system to con-
trol the importation and distribution of alcoholic beverages.8 Under a
three-tiered distribution system, producers of alcoholic beverages are
permitted to sell only to state-licensed wholesalers, who in turn may
sell only to state-licensed retailers, who then sell to consumers.9 States
justified the three-tiered distribution system as a way to prevent or-
ganized crime—which had run illegal liquor empires during Prohibi-
tion—from dominating the legalized liquor industry.10 By making the
direct sale from producers and wholesalers to consumers illegal and
by precluding investment in more than one tier of the distribution sys-
tem, states were able to prevent organized crime from dominating the
industry.11 The highly-regulated three-tiered system had virtually no
detrimental effect on interstate commerce in alcoholic beverages
during the post-Prohibition era, when competition among the many
wholesalers was abundant and there were few producers of alcoholic
beverages. Few products and many wholesalers competing to distrib-
ute those products meant that the limited varieties of alcoholic bever-
ages were widely available. In fact, by the mid-1960s there were more
than 10,000 independent wholesalers engaged in the local distribution
of liquor.12 But over the past forty years the balance has shifted. The
alcoholic beverage wholesaling industry has substantially consoli-
7. See Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really Trying: Lessons
from the Repeal of Prohibition to the Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 217,
220 (1995) (“[T]here are two ways, and two ways only, in which an ordinary private citizen, act-
ing under her own steam and under color of no law, can violate the United States Constitution.
One is to enslave somebody . . . . The other is to bring a bottle of beer, wine, or bourbon into a
State in violation of its beverage control laws.”).
8. See Alix M. Freedman & John R. Emshwiller, Vintage System: Big Liquor Wholesaler
Finds Change Stalking Its Very Private World, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1999, at A1.
9. See The Wine Wars, WINE SPECTATOR (visited Feb. 16, 2000) <http://www.
winespectator.com/Wine/Spectator/Feature/shippingintro.html> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
10. See Freedman & Emshwiller, supra note 8, at A1.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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dated, and the number of alcoholic beverage producers has risen
dramatically, changing the commercial landscape of liquor distribu-
tion and overloading the states’ three-tiered distribution systems.13
Of the three classes of alcoholic beverages—liquor, beer, and
wine—most of the demand for liquor and beer today is satisfied by a
few nationally advertised brands, as it was immediately following rati-
fication of the Twenty-first Amendment.14 However, the wine market
in the United States today is far different than it was following the
end of Prohibition. The number of domestic wineries grew from 375
in 1963 to more than 2,000 in 1999, while the number of wholesalers
fell from 10,900 in 1963 to 300 in 1999.15
Massive growth in the number of wine producers and rapid con-
solidation of wholesalers have severely hampered the abilities of win-
eries to get their products to state markets and of consumers to pur-
chase the alcoholic beverages they desire. A recent survey of the
members of the Wine Institute revealed that 37% of vintners are ex-
cluded from selling their wines in at least some states because they
cannot find a wholesaler who is willing to distribute their product.16
The only avenue available to consumers who live in states where cer-
tain desired wines are unavailable is to purchase those wines from
out-of-state retailers or directly from the wineries. If the state prohib-
its the direct shipment of wines, consumers simply cannot purchase
wines that are not distributed through their state’s three-tiered distri-
bution system.17 In essence, by enforcing the three-tiered system of
liquor distribution and by prohibiting direct shipment from producers
and out-of-state retailers to consumers, states exclude these wineries
from their markets. Such state-enforced economic exclusionism is the
very thing the Commerce Clause was intended to prevent. Section
two of the Twenty-first Amendment, however, has created confusion
13. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
14. See R. W. Apple, Jr., Zinfandel by Mail? Well, Yes and No; Strict Laws Get Stricter,
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1999, at F1.
15. See 145 CONG. REC. H6862 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Thompson)
(presenting factual support for the argument that small wine producers face increasing competi-
tion and difficulty in gaining acceptance by wholesalers, and thus need to use other avenues to
sell their products to consumers).
16. See Freedman & Emshwiller, supra note 8, at A1 (citing a Wine Institute survey).
17. See, e.g., Tom Campbell, Wine-Shipment Law Challenged: Individuals, Wineries Are
Suing ABC Board, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 18, 1999, at B1 (detailing the experience
of a Virginia resident who tried twice to order wines from other states by mail and was refused
in both attempts by the wineries, which informed the consumer that her state has made it a
crime to ship wine to a resident from another state or to receive such a shipment).
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about the extent to which the Commerce Clause applies to this spe-
cial commercial article, wine.
Part I of this Note reviews the dormant Commerce Clause as it
stands in current Supreme Court jurisprudence and its unique appli-
cation in the context of state laws restricting direct shipment of alco-
holic beverages. Part II analyzes the plain meaning and legislative his-
tory of the Twenty-first Amendment, and examines the extent to
which the Amendment might have created a dormant Commerce
Clause exception for state laws regulating the liquor trade. Part III
considers the Supreme Court’s evolving balancing test for cases
where the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause inter-
sect, and how lower federal courts have applied this test in recent
challenges to state anti-direct-shipment laws. Part IV classifies state
laws restricting direct shipment and evaluates each category under
the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause/Twenty-first Amendment
balancing test. Part V looks at recent congressional involvement in
the direct-shipment debate, with a focus on the arguments the states
have propounded in seeking federal support for their anti-direct-
shipment laws. Finally, Part VI presents a simple resolution to this in-
creasingly complex debate—a solution that will permit states to pro-
tect their core interests under the Twenty-first Amendment without
erecting unnecessary barriers to interstate commerce in alcoholic
beverages.
I.  THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND STATE REGULATION OF DIRECT
SHIPMENT
The authority of states to enforce their three-tiered distribution
systems and to pass broad legislation otherwise regulating the impor-
tation and distribution of alcoholic beverages within their borders has
been challenged only rarely since the Twenty-first Amendment was
ratified in 1933. The recent expansion of the wine industry, along with
the growing power of small wine producers and specialty wine retail-
ers to reach consumers through electronic commerce and direct mail,
however, have sparked a flurry of debate over the scope of the
Amendment that ended Prohibition and the limits the Commerce
Clause imposes on states’ powers to regulate commerce.
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A. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power “[t]o regu-
late Commerce . . . among the several States.”18 Although the text of
the Commerce Clause speaks only of Congress’s affirmative powers,
“the [Supreme] Court long has recognized that it also limits the
power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade.”19 This
negative implication of the Commerce Clause is known as the dor-
mant Commerce Clause.20 While sometimes criticized as an unwar-
ranted judicial expansion of Congress’s expressly delegated Com-
merce Clause powers, the dormant Commerce Clause has been firmly
rooted in our constitutional law for almost two hundred years.21 In
1945, Justice Robert Jackson succinctly justified the dormant Com-
merce Clause, declaring that the very purpose of the Commerce
Clause in our Constitution is to ensure “that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will
have free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embar-
goes will withhold his exports, and no foreign state will by customs
duties or regulations exclude them.”22
The Supreme Court has developed a two-tiered approach to
analyzing state regulations that affect interstate commerce, testing
state laws that discriminate against interstate commerce more strictly
than those that merely burden interstate commerce.23 If a state law
burdens, but does not discriminate against, interstate commerce, the
Court applies a balancing test, weighing “the nature of the local inter-
est involved, and . . . whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities.”24 A non-discriminatory state
18. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
19. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980).
20. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995) (re-
ferring to the negative implication of the Commerce Clause as the “dormant Commerce
Clause”); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992) (same).
21. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 311-12
(1997) (tracing the birth of the dormant Commerce Clause to Chief Justice John Marshall’s
opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), in which Marshall implied that Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause power to regulate trade between the states is exclusive, except where
states act in valid exercise of their police powers).
22. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
23. Under the Commerce Clause, “discrimination” means “differential treatment of in-
state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.” Ore-
gon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
24. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Ari-
zona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1945) (holding that a state regulation that affects interstate com-
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law violates the dormant Commerce Clause only if “the burden im-
posed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.”25 As the Court stated in Lewis v. BT Invest-
ment Managers, Inc.,26 “legislation that visits its effects equally upon
both interstate and local business may survive constitutional scrutiny
if it is narrowly drawn.”27
In contrast, a state law that discriminates against interstate com-
merce, favoring local business, “is per se invalid, save in a narrow
class of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigor-
ous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local
interest.”28 In other words, a state law that discriminates against inter-
state commerce is unconstitutional unless the state can “justify it both
in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the un-
availability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve
the local interests at stake.”29 State and local laws are deemed dis-
criminatory, and fall into this more stringent tier of dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis, if they facially discriminate against interstate
commerce or if they are facially neutral but have the purpose or effect
of disfavoring out-of-state businesses.30 For example, in C & A Car-
merce will survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny only if the regulation is rationally related
to a legitimate state objective and the burden the regulation places on interstate commerce is
outweighed by the state interest in enforcing the regulation).
25. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
26. 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
27. Id. at 36.
28. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994); see also Hughes
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (“At a minimum such facial discrimination invokes the
strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of nondiscrimina-
tory alternatives.”); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (“[W]here sim-
ple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has
been erected.”).
29. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977); see also
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27 (declaring that no matter how important the state’s ob-
jective, “it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from
outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently”).
30. The Supreme Court has consistently invalidated state laws that facially discriminate
against interstate commerce. See, e.g., New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274-78 (1988)
(finding unconstitutional an Ohio statute that gave a tax credit to fuel dealers for selling ethanol
produced in Ohio but no tax credit for sales of ethanol produced in another state); Lewis v. BT
Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 42-44 (1980) (striking down a Florida law that prevented out-
of-state banks from operating investment advisory businesses in the state); Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 526-28 (1935) (declaring that a New York milk price control law,
which prevented milk produced out-of-state from being sold at a lower price than milk pro-
duced in-state, violated the Commerce Clause). The Court has also vigorously attacked facially
neutral but effectively discriminatory state laws. See, e.g., Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352 (declaring un-
DOUGLASS.DOC 10/12/00 1:14 PM
1626 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1619
bone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,31 the Supreme Court held that a fa-
cially neutral city ordinance requiring all nonhazardous solid waste to
be deposited at an approved transfer station before leaving the mu-
nicipality had a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce, because
waste processing plants could not ship solid waste themselves but in-
stead had to pay a fee to have the state-approved transfer station ship
their waste.32 The Court found that the ordinance increased the costs
for out-of-state interests operating in the town to dispose of their
solid wastes by requiring them to use the favored local processor and
also deprived out-of-state waste processing businesses access to a lo-
cal market.33 The town’s argument that the law did not discriminate
against interstate commerce because its effects weighed evenly upon
in-state and out-of-state businesses was rejected because “[t]he ordi-
nance is no less discriminatory because in-state or in-town processors
are also covered by the prohibition.”34 Thus, the fact that a law dis-
criminating against interstate commerce also discriminates against
some in-state economic interests will not save it from strict scrutiny
under the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause analysis.
B. State Liquor Regulations and the Dormant Commerce Clause
State laws that restrict or prohibit direct shipments of alcoholic
beverages seem to be prototypical examples of laws that run afoul of
the dormant Commerce Clause. Many of these laws discriminate fa-
cially against out-of-state producers and retailers. Even those state
laws proscribing direct shipment that do not facially discriminate
against interstate commerce have a disparate impact on out-of-state
producers and retailers, and therefore are discriminatory in effect.35
State anti-direct-shipment laws prevent out-of-state producers and re-
constitutional a North Carolina law that prohibited apples sold in the state from bearing any
grade other than a grade prescribed by the federal grading scheme because of the law’s dis-
criminatory effect on apples from the state of Washington, which were subjected to a more rig-
orous grading system); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951) (striking
down a city ordinance requiring that milk be pasteurized within five miles of the city square be-
cause, although the ordinance no more discriminated against out-of-state milk than it did milk
pasteurized in the state but outside the five-mile zone, the law placed “a discriminatory burden
on interstate commerce [that] would invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas destruc-
tive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause”).
31. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
32. See id. at 387-89.
33. See id. at 389-91.
34. Id. at 391.
35. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
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tailers of alcoholic beverages from transacting business with in-state
consumers. The Supreme Court has been relentless in enforcing its
edict from Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.36 that “one state in its deal-
ings with another state may not place itself in a position of economic
isolation.”37 For example, the Court has used the dormant Commerce
Clause to invalidate state laws requiring trucks to use a certain type of
mudflap,38 limiting the length of railroad trains39 and tractor trailers,40
requiring that apples not bear another state’s grading labels,41 and re-
quiring interstate shippers to have state licenses.42 Given these and a
multitude of other cases applying the Court’s well-established dor-
mant Commerce Clause analysis, examining state laws restricting the
direct shipment of alcoholic beverages to consumers would seem to
be a straightforward exercise. Applying the test from C & A Car-
bone,43 these laws should be per se invalid unless the state can prove
they are the least discriminatory means of advancing a legitimate
state interest.44
Typically when a state law that discriminates against interstate
commerce is challenged, dormant Commerce Clause analysis is con-
clusive. In analyzing the validity of state anti-direct-shipment laws,
however, the dormant Commerce Clause is not the only constitu-
tional provision that must be consulted: the Twenty-first Amendment
also must be considered.
When states regulate the liquor trade, the Twenty-first Amend-
ment and the dormant Commerce Clause swirl together, creating a
36. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
37. Id. at 527.
38. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 528-29 (1959) (finding that a statute
requiring all trucks traveling on the state’s roads to use curved mudflaps, while not discrimina-
tory, placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce).
39. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781-82 (1945) (holding unconstitutional
a state law which limited the maximum length of passenger and freight trains because the law’s
dubious safety benefits were outweighed by the burden it placed on interstate commerce).
40. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671-73 (1981) (finding that
the state provided no persuasive evidence that the prohibited sixty-five-foot double trailers were
any less safe than trailers the state permitted to operate on its roadways).
41. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353-54 (1977)
(finding unconstitutional a state law that prevented apples sold in the state from bearing any
grade other than a standard U.S. grade because the law discriminated against apple growers in
states with more sophisticated and expensive apple grading systems).
42. See Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 316 (1925) (holding unconstitutional a state law
which required common carriers using public highways to obtain a license from the state).
43. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
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turbid mixture that makes determining the constitutional validity of
such state laws difficult. Ironically, the non-textual dormant Com-
merce Clause is the clearer of the two components in this constitu-
tional concoction; interpreting the Twenty-first Amendment has
proven exceedingly difficult.
II.  THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT
The Twenty-first Amendment is comprised of three sections: sec-
tion one simply repealed the Eighteenth Amendment;45 section three
set a time limit of seven years for the states to ratify the Amend-
ment;46 section two provides that “[t]he transportation or importation
into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for deliv-
ery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited.”47 Judges and commentators have de-
bated whether section two completely trumps the dormant Com-
merce Clause, granting to states the authority to regulate interstate
commerce in alcoholic beverages unfettered by the constitutional
constraints of the Commerce Clause.48 As in statutory construction,
ascertaining the true scope of section two must begin with an analysis
of the plain meaning of its text, followed by due consideration for the
intent of the Congress that crafted it.49
45. “The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is
hereby repealed.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
46. “This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to
the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within
seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.” U.S. CONST.
amend. XXI, § 3. After the debacle surrounding the ratification of the Twenty-seventh
Amendment, which was presented to the states with no timetable for ratification and subse-
quently took over 200 years to garner the requisite number of state approvals, such a time limit
seems, especially in comparison, uncontroversial. See Tribe, supra note 7, at 218.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
  48. See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & ROBERT D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §4.9, at
163 n.33, § 8.8, at 300-01 (West 5th ed. 1995) (discussing generally the interplay between the
Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause); Vijay Shanker, Note, Alcohol Direct
Shipment Laws, The Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-first Amendment, 85 VA. L. REV. 353,
372-83 (1999) (remarking on the historical development of Twenty-first Amendment and Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence).
49. Cf. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-24 (1997) (looking first at the text and
design of the Fourteenth Amendment and then to its legislative history in ascertaining the
Amendment’s meaning); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519-48 (1969) (examining the text
and the history of the Qualifications Clause to determine the scope of authority that the Clause
grants to Congress to judge its members).
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A. Plain Meaning
Analysis of the meaning of a constitutional provision must begin
with an examination of its text.50 However, interpreting the meaning
of the language employed in a constitutional amendment depends not
simply on the naked meaning of its words, but also on the context.51
The difficulty in applying these plain meaning principles of construc-
tion to section two of the Twenty-first Amendment is that the text of
the Amendment, read independently and in the context of other con-
stitutional provisions, can be interpreted very broadly or very nar-
rowly with equal justification.
At one extreme, section two can be read as implicitly granting
the states a complete exemption from the operation of other constitu-
tional provisions in the regulation of trade in alcoholic beverages.
States could, under this interpretation, impose large importation taxes
on all out-of-state alcoholic beverages while exempting in-state pro-
ducers from any taxes whatsoever. Such a facially discriminatory law
would be protected from invalidation under the dormant Commerce
Clause by this broad interpretation. Yet, even in its most liberal
reading of section two, the Supreme Court has never suggested that
states have such unrestricted authority in regulating alcoholic bever-
ages.52
50. See Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570-71 (1840) (“In expounding the Con-
stitution of the United States, every word must have its due force, and appropriate mean-
ing . . . .”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824) (“We know of no rule for con-
struing the extent of such powers, other than is given by the language of the instrument which
confers them, taken in connexion [sic] with the purposes for which they were conferred.”); Mar-
tin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 338-39 (1816) (“If the text be clear and distinct,
no restriction upon its plain and obvious import ought to be admitted, unless the inference be
irresistible.”).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (discounting the respondent’s
purely textual analysis of the Fifth Amendment because “the argument overlooks the cardinal
rule to construe provisions in context”); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
645 (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that the provisions of the Constitution cannot be read in
isolation but rather must be read in context).
52. See, e.g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982) (finding that the
Twenty-first Amendment does not exclude state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the Es-
tablishment Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 209 (1976) (pronouncing that states cannot
regulate the liquor industry in a manner that violates the Equal Protection Clause); Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (declaring that the Twenty-first Amendment did not
exempt state liquor regulations from Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements); De-
partment of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 344 (1964) (declaring that
“[t]his Court has never so much as intimated that the Twenty-first Amendment has operated to
permit [the type of discriminatory taxation that] the Export-Import Clause precisely and explic-
itly forbids”).
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The plain meaning of section two can also be read very narrowly.
On its face the language in section two grants no new powers to the
states to regulate alcoholic beverages but merely adds the explicit
support of the Constitution to state laws regulating the importation
and transportation of alcoholic beverages—laws that formerly were
preempted by the Eighteenth Amendment. Thus section two can be
interpreted as presupposing that the state laws it protects do not vio-
late the dormant Commerce Clause. After all, section two only pro-
hibits “transportation or importation into any State . . . for delivery or
use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof.”53
Arguably, nothing in the text of section two overtly expands the pow-
ers of the states to regulate alcoholic beverages beyond the authority
they would otherwise have.
Having derived no singularly correct meaning from the text of
section two, one turns to the legislative history to determine what the
enacting Congress intended. Notwithstanding Justice Powell’s admo-
nition that the Supreme Court should be hesitant to look to the legis-
lative history of the Twenty-first Amendment for help in ascertaining
its proper meaning,54 the Court has regularly acknowledged the valid-
ity of consulting the legislative history of constitutional provisions
when textual analysis is not determinative.55
B. Congressional History
Even textualists like Justices Scalia and Thomas acknowledge the
value of examining ratification debates to interpret provisions of the
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
54. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 107
n.10 (1980).
55. See, e.g., Balsys, 524 U.S. at 674 (relying exclusively on the text and context of the Fifth
Amendment in determining the scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause “[s]ince there is no help-
ful legislative history”); Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (declaring that “[w]e
consider not only the bare meaning [of the language used in a statute] but also its placement and
purpose in the statutory scheme”); Brown v. Garnder, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994) (“‘[T]he mean-
ing of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.’” (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s
Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991))); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317-18 (1941) (declar-
ing that “[t]o decide [the meaning of a constitutional provision] we turn to the words of the
Constitution read in their historical setting as revealing the purpose of its framers, and search
for admissible meanings of its words which, in the circumstances of their application, will effec-
tuate those purposes”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368-69 (1910) (looking first at the
text and then to historical congressional debate in trying to determine what constitutes “cruel
and unusual punishment” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment).
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Constitution.56 Because the only clear principle that can be gleaned
from the text of the Twenty-first Amendment is that it was intended
to end the failed noble experiment of constitutional Prohibition, the
Supreme Court has frequently looked beyond the text of section two
to its legislative history in its efforts to ascertain the scope of author-
ity that the Twenty-first Amendment conferred on the states.57
The legislative history of the Twenty-first Amendment supports
three distinct interpretations of section two. The most restrictive in-
terpretation supported is that section two did not exempt the states
from any other provisions of the Constitution, but merely returned
authority to regulate commerce in intoxicating liquors to the states.
The second interpretation of section two, revealed only in its legisla-
tive history, is that it was included in the Amendment solely to ensure
that states wanting to remain dry after repeal of the Eighteenth
Amendment would have the power to enact laws to do so. The final
and most expansive interpretation that can be gleaned from the leg-
islative history of section two is that it entirely exempted state regula-
tion of commerce in alcoholic beverages from the limitations of the
Commerce Clause, which otherwise would prevent states from dis-
criminating against such interstate commerce. The debates over pro-
posed versions of the Amendment reveal that each of these views was
held by some members of Congress who ultimately supported the in-
clusion of section two in the Twenty-first Amendment.
The Twenty-first Amendment garnered the requisite two-thirds
vote in each house of Congress without raising much substantive de-
56. Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas have often looked to the Framers or to ratification
debates to construe provisions of the Constitution. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 909-25 (1997) (Scalia, J.); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 219-25 (1995) (Scalia, J.); Morri-
son v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,
514 U.S. 779, 845-926 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Professor Eskridge has identified this
irony. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not
Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1301 (noting that even textualists
Scalia and Thomas freely look to the history of constitutional provisions when interpreting their
meaning, even though these Supreme Court Justices are reluctant to consider legislative history
when construing statutes).
57. See 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 346-47 n.10 (1987) (reviewing the legisla-
tive history of section two of the Twenty-first Amendment and disagreeing with the dissent’s
position that congressional intent undercuts the Court’s holding); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,
468 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1984) (looking at the congressional history of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment for guidance in interpreting section two); Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Dis-
tilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 345-46 (1964) (pointing to both the language and the history of the
Twenty-first Amendment as support for holding that state liquor regulations are not exempt
from the Export-Import Clause).
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bate, probably because most members of Congress saw section one,
the simple repeal of constitutional Prohibition, as the bulk of the
Amendment’s purpose and substance.58 It seems that sections two and
three of the Amendment were seen as being primarily procedural sec-
tions, necessary to support and implement section one. What substan-
tive debate there was regarding the formulation of the Amendment
focused principally on two subjects: whether the text should explicitly
prohibit saloons59 and the means of ratifying the Amendment. The
meaning of the provision that became section two of the Twenty-first
Amendment was subjected to limited scrutiny.
1. Debate on Section Two of Senate Joint Resolution 211.
Whether section two would be included in the version of the
Resolution presented to the states for ratification was uncertain until
the final votes were cast. Senator Blaine, speaking on behalf of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, defended the inclusion of section two in
the proposed constitutional amendment by stating that the
Committee included it “to assure the so-called dry States against the
importation of intoxicating liquor into those States.”60 During his
presentation of Senate Joint Resolution 211, the original bill that
became the Twenty–first Amendment, Senator Blaine reiterated
several times that the purpose of section two was to guarantee
protection to states that might choose to remain dry,61 and concluded
by saying, “I am willing to grant to the dry States full measure of
protection, and thus prohibit the wet States from interfering in their
internal affairs respecting the control of intoxicating liquors.”62 These
58. See generally supra notes 59-72. In the Senate, more debate was devoted to a dispute
over whether the Amendment should require ratification by state legislatures or by state con-
ventions than was devoted to defining the meaning of section two of the proposal. See 76 CONG.
REC. 4148-69 (1933) (debating a proposed amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 211 that
would substitute the requirement of ratification by state “conventions” for the requirement of
ratification by state “legislatures”). Senate Joint Resolution 211 passed the Senate by a vote of
63-23, garnering the necessary two-thirds vote for a proposed constitutional amendment. See id.
at 4231 (recording the Senate’s roll call vote on Resolution 211). Senate Joint Resolution 211
passed the House by a vote of 289-121, garnering the necessary two-thirds vote for a proposed
constitutional amendment. See id. at 4516 (recording the House of Representatives’ roll call
vote on Resolution 211).
59. See id. at 4215-30 (detailing Senate debate on the saloon issue); id. at 4510-16, 4518-22,
4526-29 (detailing House debate on the saloon issue).
60. 76 CONG. REC. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine).
61. See id. (“The [Senate Judiciary] [C]ommittee felt . . . that we could well afford to guar-
antee to the so-called dry States the protection designed by section two.”).
62. Id.
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remarks on behalf of the Judiciary Committee create a reasonable
inference that the Committee that crafted section two intended it to
serve the limited purpose of allowing states to remain dry after the
repeal of Prohibition.
Not all Senators, however, agreed with the Judiciary Commit-
tee’s interpretation. Even Senator Blaine himself, no longer speaking
on behalf of the Judiciary Committee but defending section two per-
sonally, offered a broader interpretation: the section could be inter-
preted as “restoring to the States . . . the right to regulate commerce
respecting a single commodity—namely, intoxicating liquor.”63 At
first blush, this language seems to support the argument that section
two created a Commerce Clause carve-out, granting states the power
to regulate even interstate commerce involving alcoholic beverages.
At least one commentator has pointed to Senator Blaine’s personal
defense of section two as conclusive evidence that it was meant to ex-
empt state regulations of alcoholic beverages from the operation of
the Commerce Clause altogether.64 A closer look at Senator Blaine’s
statement, which centered on the word “restoring,” reveals at least
equal support, however, for the contention that section two merely
returned the authority that the Eighteenth Amendment had taken
from the states—the use of their police powers to enact alcoholic
beverage regulations subject to the limits of the Commerce Clause.
Debate among other senators provides no clearer guidance on
the proper role of section two in the Twenty-first Amendment. The
discussion that ensued when Senator Robinson proposed to strike
section two from Joint Resolution 211 demonstrates the range of
views among senators on the meaning of that section. Senator Borah
defended section two, arguing “we can[not] afford to strip the
amendment of all effort to protect the dry states.”65 Senator Borah
then embarked on a lengthy speech in which he described the hapless
plight of those states that, absent section two, would choose to remain
dry but would be unable to fend off those who inevitably would vio-
late their efforts by illegally importing alcohol, extolling the need to
include language explicitly supporting states’ rights to remain dry in
63. Id. at 4143.
64. See Richard S. Mandel, Note, Liquor Advertising: Resolving the Clash Between the First
and Twenty-First Amendments, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 167-68 (1984) (stating that the legislative
history of the Twenty-first Amendment “clearly discloses” the Framers’ intent to create an ex-
emption for states to regulate commerce in alcoholic beverages unrestricted by the Commerce
Clause).
65. 76 CONG. REC. 4170 (1933) (statement of Sen. Borah).
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the proposed amendment.66 Senator Wagner seconded Senator Bo-
rah’s defense of section two, saying that “if the dry States want addi-
tional assurance that they will be protected I shall have no objec-
tion.”67 Senator Robinson, acknowledging the weight of Senator
Borah’s remarks, then recanted his proposal to delete section two
from the Resolution, saying that he did not “wish to ask the Senate to
put itself in the position of denying any measure of protection to dry
territory.”68 This dialogue among senators who supported the inclu-
sion of section two in Senate Joint Resolution 211 suggests that the
provision was understood simply as protection for dry states—an ef-
fort to enable them to use their police powers to block all importation
of intoxicating liquors. Nothing in these remarks suggests that any of
these three ultimate supporters of section two believed it would give
wet states the authority to regulate commerce in alcoholic beverages
in a way that would run afoul of the Commerce Clause.
When Senate Joint Resolution 211, having passed the Senate,
was sent to the House for consideration, the brief debate concerning
the Resolution focused on the same issues. Representative Robinson
summarized the provisions of the Resolution to the other representa-
tives as follows: “Section 1 repeals the eighteenth amendment. Sec-
tion 2 attempts to protect dry States. Section 3 provides State ratifica-
tion by the convention method within seven years. It does not say a
word against the return of the saloon!”69
66. See id. at 4170-71. In his oratory, Senator Borah disparagingly referred to the Supreme
Court case of Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888), in which the Court held
that states could not use a licensing requirement, which required common carriers to obtain a
state license to bring intoxicating liquors into the state, to prevent unlicensed shippers from car-
rying intoxicating liquors into the state. See id. at 500. Bowman was one of the seminal cases
establishing the dormant Commerce Clause. In Bowman, the Court ruled that when Congress
has failed to pass legislation touching a matter of interstate commerce, it is presumed that Con-
gress intends the matter to remain unfettered by any legislation or regulation. See id. Senator
Borah cited the Bowman case as exemplifying that dry states could not rely on their police pow-
ers to protect against the importation of liquor absent express authorization of Congress to do
so. See 76 CONG. REC. 4171 (1933) (statement of Sen. Borah). Senator Borah’s argument is the
closest any member of either house came to asserting affirmatively that section two created a
Commerce Clause carve-out for states, allowing them unfettered authority to regulate even in-
terstate transactions involving alcoholic beverages. Nevertheless, Senator Borah asserted that
his intention in supporting section two was to create and protect the right of states to remain
dry. See id.
67. 76 CONG. REC. 4171 (1933) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
68. Id. (statement of Sen. Robinson).
69. See id. at 4518 (statement of Rep. Robinson).
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2. Consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 202. Shortly before
the vote was taken in the Senate on Senate Joint Resolution 211,
Senator Glass proposed Senate Joint Resolution 202 as a substitute.
Senate Joint Resolution 202 contained a single section which, besides
repealing the Eighteenth Amendment, would have outlawed saloons
explicitly, prevented importation of alcoholic beverages into dry
states, and granted concurrent power of enforcement to Congress and
the states.70 Senator Fletcher, expressing general approval of Senate
Joint Resolution 202 as a viable substitute for Joint Resolution 211,
requested that Senator Glass redact the “concurrent power” language
because it would create unnecessary confusion. Senator Fletcher
argued that since “Congress has power to regulate interstate
commerce and to prohibit the movement of wet goods into dry
States . . . we do not need to express that in a new amendment to the
Constitution.”71 Senator Glass responded that, as he interpreted
Senate Joint Resolution 202, “[l]iquors may be shipped across a State
in interstate commerce from one wet State to another wet State, but
the resolution . . . prohibits the shipment of intoxicating liquors into a
State whose laws prohibit the manufacture, transportation, and sale
of liquors.”72 Thus, Senator Glass and Senator Fletcher agreed that
their goal was to support an amendment to the Constitution that
would retain in full force Congress’s Commerce Clause powers while
ensuring that dry states had the authority necessary to prevent illegal
shipment of liquor into their territory.73
70. See id. at 4211-12 (statement of Sen. Glass). The text of Senate Joint Resolution 202, in
relevant part, provided:
Article XVIII of the amendments to this Constitution is hereby repealed. The sale of
intoxicating liquors within the United States or any territory subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof for consumption at the place of sale (commonly known as a saloon), and
the transportation of intoxicating liquors into any State, Territory, District, or posses-
sion of the United States in which the manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxi-
cating liquors are prohibited by law, are hereby prohibited. The Congress and the
several States, Territories, and possessions shall have concurrent power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation.
Id.
71. 76 CONG. REC. 4219 (1933) (statement of Sen. Fletcher).
72. Id. (statement of Sen. Glass).
73. Besides the brief exchange between Senators Glass and Fletcher, all debate considering
Senate Joint Resolution 202 as a substitute for Senate Joint Resolution 211 focused on the ex-
plicit anti-saloon provision in Resolution 202, with several senators remarking that they would
have no preference for either Resolution if Senator Glass would amend his proposal so that
Congress’s “concurrent power” did not give it authority to regulate saloons. See id. at 4218-22
(detailing statements by Senators Reed and Barkley conditioning their support of Senator
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Although Senate Joint Resolution 202 ultimately was rejected by
a vote of 46-38 as a replacement for Joint Resolution 211, the debate
about the differences between the two proposals demonstrates that
many supporters of the Twenty-first Amendment perceived section
two as simply a measure included to protect dry states. The absence
of more substantive debate on the meaning of section two and the
relatively few members of Congress who presented their interpreta-
tions of that provision during the debate make it difficult to draw fur-
ther meaningful conclusions from the legislative history. One can le-
gitimately assert, however, that the limited legislative history of
section two supports reading that provision narrowly—as an all-or-
nothing protection for dry states—as much as it supports reading the
section broadly—as a complete Commerce Clause exemption for
state liquor laws.
The plain meaning of the text and the legislative history, taken
together, do not reveal a single, correct interpretation of the effect the
Amendment had on state authority to regulate commerce in alcoholic
beverages following the repeal of Prohibition. Absent definitive in-
terpretive guidance on the issue from the text or history of the
Twenty-first Amendment, the Supreme Court—as the authoritative
expositor of the Constitution—has been left the task of disentangling
this interpretive thicket.
III.  INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT: EVOLUTION OF INTERPRETIVE
JURISPRUDENCE
Since the Twenty-first Amendment was ratified on December 5,
1933, the Supreme Court has unwaveringly declared that the
Amendment does not limit other provisions of the Constitution, ex-
cept for the Commerce Clause.74 Regarding the Commerce Clause,
Supreme Court jurisprudence has been much less consistent, evolving
from a very broad reading of the Twenty-first Amendment in cases
Glass’s amendment on removal of the “concurrent power” language); id. at 4225 (recording a
statement by Senator Reed declaring that he would vote for either resolution if the “concurrent
power” clause were stricken from Senate Joint Resolution 202). Senator Gore attested that “the
purpose of the substitute offered by . . . Senator [Glass] is to prevent the return of the saloon.”
Id. at 4222 (statement of Sen. Gore). As Senator Reed stated, absent language giving Congress
and the States concurrent power to regulate saloons in whatever resolution was adopted, “Con-
gress will have no power to provide prohibition enforcement in the separate States, further than
the power it now has to regulate interstate commerce.” Id. at 4225 (statement of Sen. Reed).
74. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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decided immediately following ratification to a much narrower inter-
pretation of the Amendment over the past forty years. In fact, the
most recent Supreme Court cases addressing the interplay between
the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amendment seem to
have all but abandoned the notion, espoused in earlier decisions, that
the Twenty-first Amendment absolutely shields state liquor regula-
tions from Commerce Clause scrutiny. Furthermore, lower federal
courts, pointing to these recent Supreme Court cases, have confirmed
this narrowing interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment, dis-
agreeing with states’ arguments that the Amendment protects liquor
laws that affect interstate commerce and finding the laws unconstitu-
tional.
A. Early Supreme Court Interpretation of the Twenty-first
Amendment
The Supreme Court was presented with several cases involving
the intersection of the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first
Amendment in the years following ratification. At each opportunity,
the Court interpreted the scope of the Twenty-first Amendment
broadly, finding that state authority to regulate commerce in intoxi-
cating liquors was entirely free from the restrictions of the dormant
Commerce Clause.75 For example, in State Board of Equalization v.
Young’s Market Co., a 1936 decision marking the Supreme Court’s
first foray into this interpretive bog, the Court said that the Twenty-
first Amendment “confer[s] upon the State the power to forbid all
importations which do not comply with the conditions which it pre-
scribes.”76 If the decision in Young’s Market left any doubt that the
Twenty-first Amendment created a complete Commerce Clause
carve-out for states to regulate all aspects of commerce involving al-
coholic beverages, only three years later, in Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, the
Court affirmed its earlier interpretation by declaring that “[t]he
Twenty-first Amendment sanctions the right of a State to legislate
75. See, e.g., Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939) (“Without doubt a State may
absolutely prohibit the manufacture of intoxicants, their transportation, sale, or possession, irre-
spective of where produced or obtained . . . .”); Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control
Comm’n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1939) (“Since the Twenty-first Amendment . . . the right of a state
to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the commerce
clause . . . .”); State Bd. of Equalization v. Young’s Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 61-62 (1936) (up-
holding broad state authority to regulate the “importation and transportation” of intoxicating
liquor in ways that, absent the Twenty-first Amendment, would violate the Commerce Clause).
76. 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936).
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concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without, unfettered by
the Commerce Clause.”77
Over the past four decades, the Supreme Court has retreated
substantially from its early, broad interpretations of the Twenty-first
Amendment. The passage of time, and more careful consideration of
the substantial role that the dormant Commerce Clause plays in pre-
venting states from engaging in commercial isolationism in an in-
creasingly national economy, led the Court to acknowledge that the
dormant Commerce Clause should and does place limits on the ability
of the states to regulate commerce in alcoholic beverages.
B. Modern Supreme Court Twenty-first Amendment Jurisprudence
Despite narrowing its interpretation of the scope of the Twenty-
first Amendment in more recent cases, the Supreme Court has re-
mained hesitant to establish bright-line rules where the Amendment
and the Commerce Clause intersect.78 The Supreme Court’s reluc-
tance to set definitive parameters on the extent to which state laws
regulating commerce in alcoholic beverages are protected has led to a
series of challenges to such state laws. The Supreme Court’s holdings
and reasoning in these more recent cases have progressively nar-
rowed the scope of the Amendment, leaving the Amendment’s for-
merly large bite into the Commerce Clause with few, if any, remain-
ing teeth.
1. The Narrowing Scope of the Twenty-first Amendment. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor
Corp.79 gave the first clear and substantial indication that the
Commerce Clause could be an effective weapon for battling state
laws regulating the trade in alcoholic beverages. In Idlewild, the
Court explicitly rejected the logical conclusion from its earlier
opinions that the Twenty-first Amendment “has somehow operated
to ‘repeal’ the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating
liquors is concerned.”80 Instead, the Court declared: “Both the
77. 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939).
78. In fact, after reviewing its own Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court declared that “[t]hese decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line between the fed-
eral and state powers over liquor.” California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980).
79. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
80. Id. at 331-32.
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Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the
same Constitution. Like other provisions of the Constitution, each
must be considered in the light of the other, and in the context of the
issues and interests at stake in any concrete case.”81
Sixteen years later, in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,82 the Court attempted to clarify Idlewild by
distinguishing what would later be referred to as states’ “core pow-
ers” under the Amendment from other alcoholic beverage regula-
tions.83 In Midcal, the Court announced that “[t]he Twenty-first
Amendment grants the States virtually complete control over
whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure
the liquor distribution system.”84 This statement suggests that Idlewild
did not stand for the proposition that every state statute conceivably
related to the liquor trade was unfettered by the Commerce Clause.
Instead, the Midcal Court’s clarification indicates that the only state
laws that are free from the normal operation of the Commerce Clause
are those pertaining to the decision of whether to be a dry state and,
if the decision is made not to be dry, those governing the structure of
alcoholic beverage distribution. However, this seemingly clear expla-
nation was muddied somewhat by the Midcal Court’s assertions that
“[state liquor] controls may be subject to the federal commerce power
in appropriate situations”85 and that reconciling the Twenty-first
Amendment and the Commerce Clause requires a “pragmatic effort
to harmonize state and federal powers.”86 Just when the Court
seemed to be drawing a bright line between state liquor regulations
that fall within the core powers of the Twenty-first Amendment,
which states could exercise unhindered by the dormant Commerce
Clause, and liquor regulations that are subject to Commerce Clause
restraints, it complicated the distinction by suggesting that a balancing
test should be applied whenever a state liquor regulation—whether or
not an exercise of core powers—interferes with interstate commerce.
The Court clarified the operation of the core powers distinction and
the balancing test it had suggested in Midcal by applying these princi-
ples in two cases decided in 1984.
81. Id. at 332.
82. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
83. See infra Part III.B.3.
84. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 110.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 109.
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2. Balancing the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first
Amendment. In Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, the Court shed
some light on how to harmonize state liquor laws enacted under the
Twenty-first Amendment with the dormant Commerce Clause by
articulating a balancing test to be applied when a state alcoholic
beverage regulation conflicts with any federal law.87 While Capital
Cities involved a conflict between a state restriction on television
liquor advertisements and a federal law preempting all state
regulation of cable television signals, the Court characterized the
issues at stake in the same way it characterizes conflicts between state
liquor regulations and the Commerce Clause.88 The Capital Cities
Court said that where a state law purportedly enacted under the
authority of the Twenty-first Amendment collides with a federal law,
the conflict should be resolved by determining “whether the interests
implicated by [the] state regulation are so closely related to the
powers reserved by the Twenty-first Amendment that the regulation
may prevail, notwithstanding that its requirements directly conflict
with express federal policies.”89 In applying this balancing test, the
Capital Cities Court concluded that the state’s interest in preventing
the advertisment of alcoholic beverages on television was not of
sufficient gravity or related closely enough to the central purpose of
the Twenty-first Amendment to override the Supremacy Clause.90
In the same month that it handed down the Capital Cities opin-
ion, the Supreme Court rendered its most significant decision to date
interpreting the interplay between the Twenty-first Amendment and
the dormant Commerce Clause, Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias.91 At
issue in Bacchus was a Hawaii state liquor tax imposed on all alco-
holic beverages except for certain types of brandy and fruit wine pro-
duced in Hawaii.92 In evaluating the plaintiff’s Commerce Clause
challenge to the state statute, the Bacchus Court applied the Capital
Cities balancing test in a two-step analysis. In the first step, the Court
examined the statute under traditional dormant Commerce Clause
analysis.93 The Court found that the Hawaii liquor tax unjustifiably
87. 467 U.S. 714 (1984).
88. See id. at 713-14.
89. Id. at 714.
90. See id. at 715-16.
91. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
92. See id. at 265.
93. See id. at 268-73. The Court began its analysis by noting that a “cardinal rule of Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence is that no State, consistent with the Commerce Clause, may impose
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discriminated against interstate commerce.94 As it would for a case in-
volving an article of commerce like milk95 or apples,96 the Court then
looked to the state to provide a justification sufficient to overcome
the standard Commerce Clause presumption that the discriminatory
tax was unconstitutional.97 The state argued that, because the tax ap-
plied to the liquor industry, it was saved by the Twenty-first Amend-
ment.98 In the second step of the balancing test analysis, the Court
considered whether the Twenty-first Amendment shielded the dis-
criminatory state regulation from invalidation under the Commerce
Clause.99
The Bacchus Court began its Twenty-first Amendment analysis
by reiterating that the expansive interpretation it had given to section
two in its earlier decisions had been too broad.100 The Court empha-
sized its understanding that the Twenty-first Amendment “did not en-
tirely remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit
of the Commerce Clause”101 or “empower States to favor local liquor
industries by erecting barriers to competition.”102 Noting that “the
Commerce Clause itself furthers strong federal interests in preventing
economic Balkanization,” the Court asserted that “[s]tate laws that
constitute mere economic protectionism are . . . not entitled to the
same deference as laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an
unrestricted traffic in liquor.”103 Applying these principles to Hawaii’s
liquor tax scheme, the Court concluded that the discriminatory tax
a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce.” Id. at 268 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
94. See id. at 273 (rejecting the state’s claim that the tax was aimed at promoting local in-
dustry rather than discriminating against interstate commerce because a state law necessarily
discriminates against interstate commerce whether its intent is to burden out-of-state parties or
to favor in-state parties).
95. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951) (finding unconstitu-
tional a state law discriminating against milk imported from other states).
96. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 348-54 (1977)
(striking down a North Carolina law that discriminated against apple producers from the State
of Washington).
97. See Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 274 (addressing the state’s argument that even if the liquor tax
does contravene the Commerce Clause, it was a valid exercise of state power under the Twenty-
first Amendment).
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 274-76.
101. Id. at 275.
102. Id. at 276.
103. Id.
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could not be saved by the Twenty-first Amendment because it “was
[not] designed to promote temperance or carry out any other purpose
of the Twenty-first Amendment.”104 In other words, the tax was not
sufficiently related to the exercise of core powers under the Twenty-
first Amendment to be saved from the normal operation of the
Commerce Clause. The Bacchus decision remains the clearest
authoritative instruction for harmonizing the dormant Commerce
Clause with the Twenty-first Amendment.
3. The States’ “Core Powers.” As Midcal, Capital Cities, and
Bacchus establish, a state alcoholic beverage regulation that
discriminates against interstate commerce can be saved from
invalidation under dormant Commerce Clause analysis only if it was
enacted under a “core power” conferred by the Twenty-first
Amendment.105 Recently, in North Dakota v. United States, the
Supreme Court reiterated that the core concerns of the Twenty-first
Amendment are state laws that promote temperance and laws that
regulate the sale, use, and distribution of alcoholic beverages.106 The
Supreme Court’s focus on core powers has restricted the scope of
Twenty-first Amendment even further than recent opinions explicitly
indicate. If a state cannot point to a core power as the justification for
a restriction of trade in alcoholic beverages, the law stands little
chance of surviving a Commerce Clause challenge.
The Supreme Court’s narrowing of state authority to regulate
commerce in alcoholic beverages in its recent jurisprudence, along
with the development of the Commerce Clause/Twenty-first
Amendment balancing test, provides valuable guidance for navigating
this interpretive quagmire. There is lingering uncertainty, however, as
to how much leeway the Court will afford states to decide how best to
104. Id.
105. In Midcal, the Court characterized the scope of Twenty-first Amendment protections
as applying to laws regulating importation, sale, and distribution of alcoholic beverages. See
California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoc. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 110 (1980). In
Capital Cities the Supreme Court referred to state regulation of the sale or use of liquor within
its borders as “the core § 2 power.” Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 713 (1984).
Recall that in Bacchus the state could only seek the protections of the Twenty-first Amendment
for its liquor tax if it could show that the tax “was designed to promote temperance . . . [or a]
clear concern of the Twenty-first Amendment.” Bacchus, 468 U.S. at 276.
106. 495 U.S. 423 (1990); see also Pete’s Brewing Co. v. Whitehead, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1004,
1018-19 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (identifying the promotion of temperance, regulation of sale or use of
liquor, and regulation of alcoholic beverage distribution systems as states’ core powers under
the Twenty-first Amendment).
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exercise their core powers. The remaining confusion is fueled, at least
in part, by the chasm that is developing between the authority the Su-
preme Court says the Twenty-first Amendment grants to states and
the Supreme Court’s application of the Amendment in cases raising
Commerce Clause challenges to state liquor regulations.
Although the Court continues to mouth the words first uttered in
Midcal—that states have “‘virtually complete control over whether to
permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor
distribution system’”107—in practice the Court gives little deference to
a state’s assertion that a challenged liquor regulation was enacted
pursuant to a core power of the Twenty-first Amendment. For exam-
ple, in 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, an antitrust case, the Supreme
Court scoffed at the state’s argument that a price control statute was
aimed at promoting temperance (even though the law itself explicitly
stated temperance as one of its objectives) and found that the
Twenty-first Amendment did not immunize the statute from the
Sherman Act.108
In deed, if not in word, the Court all but abandoned its earlier
notion that state laws enacted even under core powers of the Twenty-
first Amendment were free from the constraints of the dormant
Commerce Clause in Healy v. Beer Institute.109 In Healy, the Supreme
Court invalidated a Connecticut law that required out-of-state alco-
holic beverage dealers to affirm that they were not charging higher
prices to Connecticut wholesalers than they were charging to whole-
salers in surrounding states, finding that the law contravened the
dormant Commerce Clause because it affected liquor prices in other
states.110 Justice Scalia concurred separately in Healy because he
found the Court’s analysis unnecessarily expansive.111 Justice Scalia
argued that “[t]he Connecticut statute’s invalidity is fully established
by its facial discrimination against interstate commerce. This is so de-
spite the fact that the law regulates the sale of alcoholic beverages,
since its discriminatory character eliminates the immunity afforded by
the Twenty-first Amendment.”112
107. 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 346 (1987) (quoting Midcal, 445 U.S. at 110).
108. 479 U.S. 335 (1987).
109. 491 U.S. 324 (1989).
110. See id. at 341.
111. See id. at 344 (Scalia, J., concurring).
112. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
DOUGLASS.DOC 10/12/00 1:14 PM
1644 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1619
These recent Supreme Court decisions reveal that no state liquor
laws are immune from potential invalidation under the dormant
Commerce Clause, even if enacted under core powers.
C. Application of the Commerce Clause/Twenty-first Amendment
Balancing Test
Since the Supreme Court announced its important decision in
Bacchus, several lower federal courts have applied and extended the
Commerce Clause/Twenty-first Amendment balancing test with con-
sistent results:113 in almost every case in which a state liquor regulation
has been found to discriminate against interstate commerce, the
courts have held that the law is not saved by the Twenty-first
Amendment.
In Loretto Winery Ltd. v. Gazzara, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York invalidated a New York
state law that forbade retail grocery stores from selling wine coolers
except those containing wine made exclusively from grapes grown in
New York.114 Not surprisingly, the Loretto Winery court found that
this law discriminated against interstate commerce.115 More striking,
however, was the court’s weighing of the state’s Twenty-first
Amendment defense that the law effectively limited sales of these al-
coholic beverages and thereby promoted temperance. Balancing the
state’s interest in exerting core Twenty-first Amendment powers with
the concern of the dormant Commerce Clause in promoting free in-
terstate commerce,116 the court held that “[w]hatever the state interest
in limiting the sale of a ‘wine product,’ it is clear that such interest
could be served equally well by resorting to alternatives less burden-
some to interstate commerce.”117 Thus, even though the court ac-
knowledged that the state was acting pursuant to a core power of the
113. Suits challenging state laws that restrict direct shipping are currently pending in several
jurisdictions, which will afford ample opportunity for application of the Commerce
Clause/Twenty-first Amendment balancing test. See Julie Hyman, Wineries Press for Lifting of
Interstate Shipping Ban, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2000, at B8 (noting that five suits challenging
states’ anti-direct-shipping laws had been filed in the previous 18 months).
114. 601 F. Supp. 850, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d sub. nom. Loretto Winery, Ltd. v. Duffy,
761 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1985).
115. See id. at 857-58 (declaring that “[u]nder traditional commerce clause jurisprudence, it
is beyond dispute that the ABC Law would be unconstitutional, as discriminatory in both its
purpose and its effect”).
116. See id. at 861 (“[W]hat is to be balanced is the state interest in promoting ‘temperance’
with the federal constitutional interest in free trade across state lines.”).
117. Id. at 863.
DOUGLASS.DOC 10/12/00 1:14 PM
2000] CONSTITUTIONAL CROSSROADS 1645
Twenty-first Amendment, it invalidated the law for interfering too
greatly with the dormant Commerce Clause.
In Cooper v. McBeath,118 the Fifth Circuit overturned a Texas law
that provided that only state residents were eligible to obtain liquor
licenses, finding that the state could enforce its liquor-licensing re-
quirements without “prohibiting equal competition of non-Texans in
the retail liquor business.”119 The Fifth Circuit rejected the State’s de-
fense that its liquor-license residency requirement maintained an or-
derly distribution system, promoted temperance and morals, and pro-
tected health and safety—all core state powers under the Twenty-first
Amendment.120 Declaring that “[t]he core concerns underlying the
Twenty-first Amendment are not entitled to greater weight than the
principle of nondiscrimination animating the Commerce Clause,” the
Cooper court struck down the statute because the state failed to dem-
onstrate that no less discriminatory alternatives could adequately pro-
tect the state’s interests.121
Following the Fifth Circuit’s lead in Cooper, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas recently granted
summary judgment to plaintiffs raising a Commerce Clause challenge
to a Texas direct-shipment law that prohibited unlicensed citizens
from importing alcoholic beverages for personal consumption and re-
stricted citizens from personally transporting more than three gallons
of wine into the state.122 That case, styled Dickerson v. Bailey, was
brought by Houston wine consumers who sought to purchase wines
unavailable in the Houston retail market by ordering them directly
from the wineries or by personally purchasing the wines at the win-
eries and then shipping the wines themselves to their homes in
Texas.123 In applying the Commerce Clause/Twenty-first Amendment
balancing test in her Dickerson opinion, Judge Harmon noted that,
while the Supreme Court’s Midcal and Idlewild opinions had indi-
cated that the Court would be deferential to state liquor regulations
enacted under core powers of the Twenty-first Amendment, the
Court had modified that prior policy of unquestioning deference to
118. 11 F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 1994).
119. Id. at 554.
120. See id. at 554-55.
121. See id.
122. See Dickerson v. Bailey, 87 F. Supp. 2d 691, 709-10 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
123. See id. at 694-95.
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states’ exercise of core powers to one of close scrutiny in Bacchus.124
Based on a review of the evolving Supreme Court and lower federal
court jurisprudence applying the Commerce Clause/Twenty-first
Amendment balancing test, Judge Harmon concluded that the Texas
anti-direct-shipment law facially discriminated against interstate
commerce and could not be saved by the Twenty-first Amendment
because the state did not prove that there were no “reasonable non-
discriminatory alternatives” in exercising its core powers of “col-
lect[ing] of taxes,” “prohibiting delivery of alcoholic beverages to dry
areas,” and “prohibiting delivery of alcoholic beverages to minors.”125
In Bridenbaugh v. O’Bannon, Indiana wine collectors challenged
that state’s 1998 law prohibiting direct shipment of alcoholic bever-
ages from persons outside the state to Indiana residents.126 In evalu-
ating the plaintiffs’ claim that the law violated the dormant Com-
merce Clause by preventing them from purchasing wines from other
states and having them shipped to their residences, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana interpreted the
scope of states’ core powers under section two of the Twenty-first
Amendment so narrowly as to find the Commerce Clause/Twenty-
first Amendment balancing test inapplicable.127 Under its all-or-
124. See id. at 707 (“In applying the two-tier balancing test to challenged liquor statutes to
determine first whether they discriminate against out-of-state interests and, if so, whether they
are ‘saved’ by the twenty-first amendment, the courts have increasingly emphasized federal in-
terests and more carefully scrutinized the actual purpose behind the state’s law.”).
125. Id. at 710. Judge Harmon may have gone a bit too far in her characterization of the dis-
criminatory effects the Texas statute had on interstate commerce. Besides burdening the ability
of Texas citizens to purchase wines produced in other states and cutting off Texas as a market to
wineries that did not have access or had difficulty gaining access to the state’s three-tier distribu-
tion system, Judge Harmon suggested that the law improperly attempted to regulate commerce
in other states. See id. at 695. At first blush this line of reasoning seems plausible. Mail-order
and Internet sales transactions do take place in the state where the seller, not the buyer, is lo-
cated, as provided under U.C.C. § 2-401(2)(a). The Texas statute at issue, however, did not for-
bid these types of transactions from taking place. See TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 107.07
(West 1995). Instead, the statute prohibited delivery of alcoholic beverages, however purchased,
to unlicensed persons within the state unless the purchaser physically accompanied the ship-
ment. See id. Thus, while prohibiting delivery of any alcoholic beverages legally purchased
through mail-order or over the Internet may have the practical effect of deterring such transac-
tions, the statute did not explicitly exert the type of extraterritorial regulation of commerce that
Judge Harmon suggested and that the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Healy v. Beer
Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989) and Brown-Foreman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573 (1986).
126. 78 F. Supp. 2d 828, 829 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
127. See id. at 831 (declaring that “it is the conclusion of this Court that the State of Indiana
cannot look to the Twenty-First Amendment for the constitutional salvation of the state statutes
in question”).
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nothing interpretation of section two—the view that section two
merely gave states and localities the option to remain dry after the
repeal of Prohibition128—the court perceived the issue in Bridenbaugh
as “a straight forward application of the Commerce Clause.”129 Ap-
plying standard Commerce Clause analysis,130 the district court con-
cluded that the Indiana anti-direct-shipment law facially and unjusti-
fiably discriminated against interstate commerce and was therefore
invalid.131
These recent cases applying the Supreme Court’s Commerce
Clause/Twenty-first Amendment balancing test have demonstrated
that when a state regulation of alcoholic beverages interferes with in-
terstate commerce, even a regulation enacted under the core powers
of section two, the regulation must survive dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny. Such state laws will be given little, if any, greater def-
erence because of the Twenty-first Amendment than state laws im-
pacting interstate commerce that have no independent constitutional
protection. These recent decisions have grave implications for many
states that currently prohibit direct shipments of alcoholic beverages
to their citizens.
IV.  STATE ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE DIRECT-SHIPMENT
REGULATIONS
The first three parts of this Note have addressed generally the
tensions that exist between the dormant Commerce Clause and the
Twenty-first Amendment, and the evolving interpretation of state
powers under the Amendment. Since the Supreme Court’s reading of
the Twenty-first Amendment has narrowed, and the number of small
wineries has expanded dramatically since the 1960s,132 the constitu-
tionality of state laws that restrict or prohibit the direct shipment of
alcoholic beverages from out-of-state producers or retailers to con-
sumers is in doubt.
128. As the Bridenbaugh court noted, the plain meaning and the legislative history of sec-
tion two of the Twenty-first Amendment do reasonably support reading the Amendment as
providing states the limited power to choose to remain dry. See supra Part II. Nevertheless, the
Bridenbaugh court is the only modern court that has reached that interpretive conclusion.
129. Bridenbaugh, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
130. For a review of standard dormant Commerce Clause analysis, see supra Part I.A.
131. See Bridenbaugh, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 832 (holding that “these statutes on their face dis-
criminate against out of state commerce. . . . [T]his Court has no choice but to declare these In-
diana statutes in conflict with the Commerce Clause of Article I of the Constitution”).
132. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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Although states point to section two of the Twenty-first
Amendment as granting them explicit authority to restrict or prohibit
direct shipment of alcoholic beverages notwithstanding the dormant
Commerce Clause, our review of the text, legislative history, and Su-
preme Court jurisprudence of the Amendment has shown that this
notion of unrestricted state power to interfere with interstate com-
merce in intoxicating liquors is overstated.133 In fact, the most recent
interpretations of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause/Twenty-
first Amendment balancing test suggest that many of these state laws,
if challenged, would not pass constitutional muster. For purposes of
this analysis, states regulating direct shipments of alcoholic beverages
can be classified into the following three categories: (1) states that
permit direct shipments in limited quantities,134 (2) states that permit
reciprocal direct shipments,135 and (3) states that prohibit all direct
133. See supra Parts I-III.
134. Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Rhode Island permit limited direct shipment, although
some of these states impose limitations or requirements on the producer and/or the consumer.
See Opinion of Alaska Att’y Gen., June 25, 1953 (stating that unlicensed individuals may import
a reasonable quantity of alcoholic beverages for personal use); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-
436 (West 1999) (providing that individuals may import limited quantities of alcoholic beverages
purchased by the individual within the United States for personal consumption); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 4, § 526 (1999) (permitting, as of June 1, 2000, Delaware adult citizens to purchase for
personal consumption limited quantities of beer and wine not readily available in the state from
producers and retailers in other states); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-137 (1999) (allowing very limited
quantities of alcoholic beverages to be shipped directly to residents); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
26:359 (West 1999) (allowing direct shipment of no more than four cases of wine per year from a
licensed manufacturer or retailer in another state to an adult Louisiana resident, provided the
shipper obtains a direct shipping permit from Louisiana and pays all state liquor taxes); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 53-194.03 (1999) (permitting direct shipment of up to nine liters of alcoholic liquor
per month to a Nebraska resident for the resident’s personal use); NEV. REV. STAT. § 369.490
(1999) (prescribing that a Nevada resident may import directly from another state up to twelve
cases of wine per year for personal use); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178:14-a (1999) (allowing an
out-of-state manufacturer, importer, wholesaler, or retailer licensed in its domiciliary state to
direct-ship no more than sixty one-liter containers of alcoholic beverages per year to any New
Hampshire consumer, provided the shipper obtains a direct shipper’s permit and pays a tax on
all shipments); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-16 (1999) (legalizing direct shipment of up to nine liters
per month from an out-of-state location to an adult North Dakota resident); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
3-1-1, 3-4-1 (1999) (defining “import” as transport into the state of more than three gallons of
wine in a single shipment and thus not proscribing the direct shipment of wine in quantities less
than three gallons per shipment).
135. California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin permit direct shipments from retailers or producers
in other states but only from states that have reciprocal provisions. See CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 23661.2 (West 1999) (providing that unlicensed adult residents may “receive a shipment
of wine . . . from any state of the United States that allows adult residents of that state to re-
ceive . . . shipments . . . from California”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-104 (1999) (“[T]he holder
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shipments.136
of an alcoholic beverage license that authorizes the manufacture of vinous liquors in a state that
affords Colorado adults or licensees an equal reciprocal shipping privilege may ship . . . vinous
liquors . . . to any adult resident of this state.”); IDAHO CODE § 23-1309A (1999) (permitting
residents over twenty-one years of age to receive by direct shipment no more than two cases of
wine per month for personal consumption from another state, but only if the state from which
the wine is shipped allows its residents to receive direct shipments of wine from Idaho); 235 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/6-29 (West 1999) (providing that adult residents and holders of alcoholic bever-
age licenses of other states may direct-ship up to two cases of wine per year to any adult Illinois
resident, provided that the shipper resides in a state that affords a reciprocal shipping privilege
to Illinois adult residents or alcoholic beverage licensees); IOWA CODE § 123.187 (1999) (allow-
ing wineries in other states to direct-ship by common carrier no more than eighteen liters of
wine per month for personal consumption to adult Iowa residents, but only if the state where
the shipping winery is located affords a reciprocal shipping privilege to Iowa wineries); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 340A.417 (West 1999) (“[A] winery licensed in a state which affords Minnesota
wineries an equal reciprocal shipping privilege . . . may ship, for personal use and not for resale,
not more than two cases of wine . . . in any calendar year to any resident of Minnesota age 21 or
over.”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 311.462 (West 1999) (providing that adult residents or licensed liq-
uor sellers in a state that permits Missouri residents or licensees a reciprocal shipping privilege
may ship no more than two cases of wine to an adult Missouri resident for personal use); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 60-7A-3 (Michie 1999) (permitting direct shipment of up to two cases of wine per
month from out-of-state persons to adult New Mexico residents, provided the shipper’s state
affords New Mexico residents equal reciprocal shipping privileges); OR. REV. STAT. § 471.229
(1999) (sanctioning the tax-free direct shipment of two cases per month of wine from another
state to an adult Oregon resident, provided the wine is sent from a state that permits its resi-
dents to receive wine shipments from Oregon tax-free); WASH. REV. CODE § 66.12.190 (1999)
(permitting out-of-state wine manufacturers to ship no more than two cases of wine per year to
a Washington resident for the resident’s personal use, provided the manufacturer first obtains
an out-of-state wine shipping license); W. VA. CODE § 60-8-6 (1999) (allowing out-of-state sell-
ers of alcoholic beverages licensed in their state of domicile to ship up to two cases of wine per
month to any adult West Virginia resident, provided the shipper’s state permits West Virginia
residents a reciprocal shipping privilege); WIS. STAT. §§ 125.58, 125.68(10) (1999) (authorizing
direct shipment from on out-of-state winery to a state resident of up to nine liters of wine per
year without an out-of-state shipper’s permit, provided the state in which the winery is located
has entered a reciprocity agreement with Wisconsin).
136. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming have enacted laws which either explicitly crimi-
nalize direct shipment from producers to customers or do so implicitly by requiring that all
commerce in alcoholic beverages be transacted through state-enforced distribution systems. See
ALA. ALCO. BEV. CONTR. BD. RULES & REGULATIONS 20-X-8.04(1) (last updated Mar. 15,
2000) <www.abcboard.state.al.us/rrch8.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“No alco-
holic beverages may be delivered from outside Alabama to any person . . . within the state, ex-
cept to the ABC Board and to manufacturers, importers, wholesalers and warehouses licensed
by the ABC Board.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-250.01 (West 1999) (prohibiting out-of-state
retailers and producers from violating any statutory provisions governing alcoholic beverage
distribution, which thereby prohibits these parties from shipping directly to unlicensed in-state
customers); ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-7-106 (Michie 1996) (making it “unlawful for any person to
ship or transport . . . into the State of Arkansas any spirituous liquors, vinous liquors, wines
other than Arkansas wines, or beer or malt beverages from points without the state” for those
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lacking a state license); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.545 (West 2000) (criminalizing direct shipment
from out-of-state locations to any unlicensed person in the state and making certain repeat vio-
lations of the section a felony); GA. CODE. ANN. § 3-3-32 (1999) (prohibiting all direct shipment
of alcoholic beverages from out-of-state sellers to unlicensed Georgia residents and making suc-
cessive violations a felony); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 281-3, 281-33.1 (Michie 2000) (making
direct shipments from out-of-state locations to persons in the state illegal, subject to a once-per-
year exception for no more than five gallons shipped to a resident who has first met the re-
quirements of and obtained a special permit); IND. CODE §§ 7.1-5-1-9.5, 7.1-5-11-1.5 (Michie
1999) (proscribing direct shipment of alcoholic beverages from persons or businesses in other
states to unlicensed Indiana residents and stating that a violation of this provision by a party not
holding a basic permit is a felony); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-104 (1993) (prohibiting all acts re-
garding alcoholic beverages not specifically allowed by statute, including direct shipping of al-
coholic beverages to Kansas consumers); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.165 (Banks-Baldwin 2000)
(making direct shipment by a seller of alcoholic beverages in another state to an unlicensed
Kentucky resident illegal, a violation of which, after the first warning, is a felony); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 28-A, § 2077-B (West 1999) (“A person may not sell, furnish, deliver or pur-
chase liquor from an out-of-state company by mail order.”); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 16-506.1
(1999) (making the shipment of alcoholic beverages, including alcoholic beverages purchased
over a computerized network, to an unlicensed recipient in the state of Maryland a felony);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 138, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1995) (prohibiting transportation and importation
of alcoholic beverages except as authorized by the chapter with no other authorization of direct
shipment from out-of-state manufacturers or retailers to unlicensed Massachusetts residents);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.3 (West 1998) (notwithstanding an exception that “a person
who is of legal age to purchase alcoholic liquor may import from another state for that person’s
personal use not more than 312 ounces of alcoholic liquor that contains less than 21% alcohol
by volume,” the Michigan statute prohibits “delivery” of alcoholic beverages, including for per-
sonal use, by any “person” other than the state liquor commission, which leads to the reason-
able interpretation that the term “import” in the exception includes only in-person transporta-
tion); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-31-47 (1994) (criminalizing unlicensed importation into or delivery
in Mississippi of alcoholic beverages); MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-3-402 (1999) (providing that
wines manufactured outside the state may only be shipped into the state if consigned and deliv-
ered to a Montana-licensed distributor and unloaded by the distributor into the distributor’s
warehouse); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-2 (West 1999) (allowing in-person importation of a limited
quantity of alcoholic beverages but making no similar exception to the general ban on unli-
censed importation for direct shipping); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 102 (McKinney 1987 &
Supp. 1999) (proscribing unconditionally the shipping into New York of alcoholic beverages
from another state, unless the shipment is consigned and delivered to a duly licensed recipient);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-102.1 (1999) (making it a felony for an out-of-state seller to direct-ship
alcoholic beverages to any North Carolina resident who is not a licensed wholesaler); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4301.19, 4301.20 (West 1999) (prohibiting direct shipment to or importa-
tion, with the exception of minimal quantities transported in-person, by a party who does not
have a state permit); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 505 (West 1999) (“[I]t is unlawful for any
manufacturer, wholesaler or retailer of alcoholic beverages, located and doing business from
outside this state, to make retail sales of alcoholic beverages to purchasers located in this state
or to ship alcoholic beverages sold at retail to persons located in this state.”); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 47, § 4-491 (West 1997) (expressly prohibiting any person not licensed to import liquor from
doing so by any means whatsoever); S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-2-175 (Law. Co-op. 1999) (forbidding
the direct shipment of alcoholic beverages by a person or entity in another state to any unli-
censed South Carolina resident); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 35-4-66, 35-4-67 (Michie 1999) (per-
mitting shipments of alcoholic beverages, other than beer, into the state from a point outside of
the state to be delivered only to persons licensed to receive such shipments); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 57-3-401, 57-3-402 (1999) (proscribing as a first-offense felony importation or direct shipment
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State laws that permit direct shipment of alcoholic beverages
from producers or retailers to consumers in limited quantities will
likely survive scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause, at least
insofar as those laws do not apply disproportionately to out-of-state
producers or retailers. State laws that favor in-state producers or re-
tailers over out-of-state producers or retailers will be indefensible.137
It is difficult to conjure up a justification for permitting in-state pro-
ducers and retailers to have broader direct-sales or direct-shipping
authority than is allowed to out-of-state producers or retailers, other
than economic protectionism. It is no less likely that an in-state win-
ery will sell or ship to a minor, that alcoholic beverages purchased
from an in-state winery will be diverted into illegal channels of distri-
bution, or that state citizens will get drunk on in-state wine than if the
wine shipment crosses a state line.
States that have enacted reciprocal direct-shipping laws, while
preferable from the consumer’s perspective relative to outright pro-
hibition, are also particularly flagrant in their violation of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause. Again, it is difficult to conceive of a core
Twenty-first Amendment concern furthered by a state reciprocity re-
quirement. Exactly how alcoholic beverages being shipped from reci-
procity states are less likely to end up in the hands of minors or in a
state’s black market, or to result in drunkenness, than wine purchased
and shipped from non-reciprocity states is hard to fathom.
of alcoholic beverages for delivery to any person not holding a wholesaler’s permit); TEX.
ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 107.07 (West 2000) (outlawing, subject to exceptions for small
amounts, importation of alcoholic beverages for the personal use of a Texas resident not hold-
ing an importer’s permit unless the resident personally accompanies the beverages across the
state line); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32A-1-109, 32A-8-501, 32A-12-503 (1999) (prohibiting the im-
portation of alcoholic beverages by any party other than the state or state licensees); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 7, § 63 (1999) (banning importation or transportation of wine into the state by persons
not holding an importer’s permit); VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-310 (Michie 1999) (criminalizing im-
portation and shipment of wine into the state unless consigned to a licensed wholesaler); WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2-203, 12-3-101 (Michie 1999) (forbidding importation or transportation of
alcoholic beverages into the state for use or consumption therein without having paid excise
taxes and holding importer’s permit).
137. Arkansas, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee are examples of states that
expressly discriminate against out-of-state producers or retailers in their direct-shipment laws.
See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 3-1-103, 3-7-106 (Michie 1996) (exempting manufacturers, distributors,
and retailers of Arkansas wines from that state’s law prohibiting direct shipments); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 61-4-720 (Law. Co-op. 1999) (permitting in-state wineries to sell, deliver, and ship wines
directly to consumers’ homes whether inside or outside of the state); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 35-
12-5 (Michie 1999) (allowing domestic farm wineries to sell wine directly to consumers); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 57-3-207 (1999) (providing that wineries using primarily Tennessee agricultural
products may sell wines directly to consumers).
DOUGLASS.DOC 10/12/00 1:14 PM
1652 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:1619
State laws that absolutely prohibit direct shipment from both in-
state and out-of-state producers to consumers require close scrutiny
in balancing the states’ exercise of core Twenty-first Amendment
powers with the primary purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause.
States insist that prohibition of direct shipments is necessary to pre-
vent minors from accessing alcoholic beverages, to maintain an or-
derly alcoholic beverage distribution system, and to promote temper-
ance.138 Each of these concerns, however, can be addressed in a less
restrictive manner than absolute prohibition of direct shipments. For
example, the concern that children are purchasing or will gain access
to alcoholic beverages by ordering them directly from the producers,
even if valid, could be resolved by much less discriminatory means
than prohibiting direct shipment altogether, such as age verification
requirements.139 Similarly, states cannot legitimately claim that direct-
shipment bans are necessary to protect state tax revenues; a very
small percentage of state revenues are derived from taxation of alco-
holic beverages, and an even smaller percentage would be lost if di-
rect shipments were permitted.140 If direct shipments were allowed,
the states that have a sales tax would still lose much more revenue on
untaxed interstate mail-order and e-commerce transactions not in-
volving alcoholic beverages than they would on untaxed liquor trans-
actions. Furthermore, states are actively working on a solution to ef-
fectively tax mail-order and e-commerce transactions, and whatever
solution they find will be equally useful in taxing direct shipments of
alcoholic beverages. The most promising defense states can make of
direct-shipment bans is that complete prohibition of these transac-
tions is necessary to promote temperance and to maintain an orderly
system of alcoholic beverage distribution. This argument is much
138.  See Clint Bolick, Wine Wars: Lift the Ban on Out-of-State Sales, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7,
2000, at A29 (noting that “[s]tate officials cite temperance and taxes,” as well as the protection
of minors, as their reasons for enacting laws that prohibit direct shipment of alcoholic bever-
ages); Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of America, Direct Shipments Threaten State Alcohol Tax and
Control Laws (visited Aug. 22, 2000) <http://www.wswa.org/dir_ship/threaten.htm> (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (warning that “direct sales to consumers by out-of-state businesses, in
most cases, avoid state excise and sales taxes . . . [and] also bypass laws against selling to under-
age persons”); supra note 125 and accompanying text.
139. See infra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
140. See Bolick, supra note 138, at A39 (noting that since winery trade associations are
willing to pay state liquor taxes on direct shipments, states are actually forgoing tax revenues by
prohibiting direct shipments); John Malmo, Wine Bill Protects Business, Not Kids, THE COM.
APPEAL, Sept. 20, 1999, at B4 (commenting that states’ interest in prohibiting direct shipments
“is not about state tax revenue, because wine taxes are peanuts compared with other interstate
shipments direct to consumers”).
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more tenable than the underage drinking and taxation arguments be-
cause it is at least a colorable exercise of the core powers granted to
states by the Twenty-first Amendment. Faced with this defense, the
question becomes whether laws that prohibit direct shipments of al-
coholic beverages are sufficiently tied to the states’ core powers under
the Twenty-first Amendment—and are the least discriminatory
means available to enforce those core powers—to outweigh ordinary
dormant Commerce Clause concerns.141
The Supreme Court’s Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence
suggests, and lower federal courts have said explicitly, that states can-
not completely prohibit direct shipments of alcoholic beverages under
the cloak of Twenty-first Amendment core powers. Furthermore,
there are less discriminatory ways to accomplish the states’ core
power goals.142 For example, most states have laws, independent of di-
rect-shipment regulations, that criminalize sales of alcoholic bever-
ages to minors and make distribution of liquor by unlicensed persons
unlawful. As Parts V and VI demonstrate, states can accomplish their
core power goals without recourse to blanket prohibition of all direct
shipments.
V.  RECENT CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE DIRECT-
SHIPPING FRAY
Congress has not remained on the sidelines during this period of
increasing tension between proponents of direct sales of alcoholic
beverages, including those made on the Internet, and states’ anti-
direct-shipment laws—a conflict that is currently being played out in
federal courts. In 1999, supporters of state direct-shipping prohibi-
tions proposed the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act, which
would permit states to enforce their direct-shipment laws against out-
of-state violators in federal court.143 Although such a federal proce-
dural intervention, as opposed to substantive legislation by Congress
expressly yielding power over interstate commerce in alcoholic bev-
141. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275 (1984) (“The question in this case
is . . . whether the principles underlying the Twenty-first Amendment are sufficiently implicated
by the [state law] to outweigh the Commerce Clause principles that would otherwise be of-
fended.”); see also supra Part III.C (describing how lower federal courts have balanced Twenty-
first Amendment and Commerce Clause concerns).
142. See supra Part III.C.
143. Both the House and Senate versions of the proposed Twenty-first Amendment En-
forcement Act were drafted as amendments to the Webb-Kenyon Act, ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699
(1913) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122) (1994).
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erages to the states,144 would do nothing to clarify the muddy conflu-
ence of state power under the Twenty-first Amendment and the re-
strictions of the dormant Commerce Clause, the debate in Congress
surrounding the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act provides
additional insight into the current status of the interstate liquor mar-
ketplace and state direct-shipment laws.
On March 10, 1999, Senator Orrin Hatch introduced Senate Bill
577—a version of the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act that
would permit a state attorney general to seek an injunction in federal
court to prevent the importation or transportation of alcoholic bever-
ages in violation of that state’s law.145 In proposing the Bill, Senator
Hatch relayed a story about a Salt Lake City thirteen-year-old who
used a borrowed credit card to purchase beer over the Internet and
144. In 1913, before the constitutionalization of the national debate over alcoholic bever-
ages by the Eighteenth and Twenty-first Amendments, Congress passed legislation entitled “An
Act Divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in certain cases,” better known as
the Webb-Kenyon Act, which provided, in relevant part:
[T]he shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means whatsoever, of
any . . . intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one State, Territory, or District of the
United States . . . into any other State, Territory, or District of the United States . . .
which said . . . intoxicating liquor is intended, by any person interested therein, to be
received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used . . . in violation of any law of such
State, Territory, or District of the United States . . . is hereby prohibited.
Id. at 699-700. Much like the text of the Twenty-first Amendment, the Webb-Kenyon Act was
susceptible to conflicting interpretations. States argued that the Act gave them plenary author-
ity to regulate all imported alcoholic beverages, but others contended that the Act merely em-
powered statutory dry states to enforce their prohibition laws. See Sidney J. Spaeth, Note, The
Twenty-first Amendment and State Control Over Intoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Fed-
eral Interest, 79 CAL. L. REV. 161, 174 n.87 (1991) (noting that both the Supreme Court and the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals endorsed a limiting construction of the Webb-Kenyon Act).
Some opponents of the Act, including President Taft, even challenged its constitutionality. See
id. at 173-75. Although a divided Supreme Court upheld the Act in Clark Distilling Co. v. West-
ern Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 331-32 (1917), it did not overturn its earlier interpretation in Ad-
ams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U.S. 190, 199 (1915), that the Act only operated to protect dry
states. Ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment, of course, rendered debate over the Webb-
Kenyon Act moot. Webb-Kenyon was reenacted without modification by Congress in 1935,
however, following repeal of national Prohibition by the Twenty-first Amendment. Webb-
Kenyon Act, ch. 740, § 202(b), 49 Stat. 877 (1935) (codified at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1994)). Although
one might point to Webb-Kenyon and argue that it constitutes a delegation of authority to
regulate interstate commerce in alcoholic beverages to the states, the Twenty-first Amendment
notwithstanding, the proper interpretation of that Act is no less controversial than the interpre-
tation of section two of the Twenty-first Amendment. Full treatment of the former controversy
is not addressed in this Note, which is devoted to consideration of the latter. Nevertheless, dis-
regard of the Webb-Kenyon Act in recent Supreme Court and lower federal court opinions
relevant to the direct shipping debate suggests that the Act will not save state regulations that
run afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause if the Twenty-first Amendment is not their savior.
145. See 145 CONG. REC. S2503 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (intro-
ducing S. 577, 106th Cong. (1999)).
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received mail-order delivery with no questions asked.146 Senator
Hatch presented this tale to demonstrate that “modern technology
has opened the door for abuse and created the need for further gov-
ernmental action to address [illegal selling of alcohol to minors]. No
longer must a State prosecute just an errant neighborhood retailer for
selling to a minor—now, the ones selling to minors . . . are a continent
away.”147 Senator Robert Byrd, supporting a modified version, made a
similar argument by citing statistics that during the month of April
1999, “approximately 34 percent of high school seniors, 22 percent of
tenth graders, and 8 percent of eighth graders . . . [got] drunk” as
strong evidence of why the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement
Act was necessary.148 Senator Byrd warned that “children can now get
beer, wine, or liquor sent directly to their homes by ordering from
catalogues or over the Internet,” and admonished that “direct-to-
consumer sales work to undermine the extremely important controls
currently in place in many of our States.”149
Representative Joe Scarborough presented H.R. 2031, the House
version of the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act, on June 7,
1999.150 Representative Scarborough accused those who would sell al-
coholic beverages over the Internet of being “modern-day bootleg-
gers,” and argued that distribution via states’ three-tiered systems is
necessary to prevent minors from purchasing alcoholic beverages.151
Representative Moakley of Massachusetts explained the purpose of
the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act to the members of
the House like this: “It says you cannot ship alcohol into a State in
violation of that State’s liquor laws. It is that simple.”152 Representa-
146. See 145 CONG. REC. S2509 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1999) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
147. Id.
148. 145 CONG. REC. S5343 (daily ed. May 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
149. Id.
150. See 145 CONG. REC. H3857 (daily ed. June 8, 1999) (statement of Rep. Scarborough)
(introducing H.R. 2031, 106th Cong. (1999)).
151. 145 CONG. REC. H6857-58 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Scarborough).
Members of the wine industry suggest that supporters of the Twenty-first Amendment En-
forcement Act and similar legislation in Congress may not be primarily motivated by their in-
terest in preventing minors from ordering wine over the Internet. See Eckstein, supra note 3, at
1. Instead, they propose that supporters may be more influenced by the powerful lobbies sup-
ported by alcohol wholesalers and distributors, the most powerful member of which is Southern
Wine & Spirits of America Inc., located in Rep. Scarborough’s home state. See id. Wholesalers
and distributors have reason to fear direct sales of wine and other alcoholic beverages over the
Internet because if direct sales are permitted, their services as “middlemen” in wine sales will no
longer be necessary. See id.
152. 145 CONG. REC. H6857 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Moakley).
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tive Moakley went on to say that “[the Twenty-first Amendment En-
forcement Act] is not a new Federal law, it is not a new State law . . .
[i]t is just a way for State attorneys general to get people who sell al-
cohol illegally to stop.”153
Opponents of the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act
contend that both of the asserted justifications for the Act—the need
to protect minors and the need to protect state tax revenues—are
merely subterfuge, covering the real purpose—protecting wholesalers
and retailers from competition from producers and out-of-state re-
tailers who want to sell their products directly to consumers.154 They
argue persuasively that state attorneys general and federal legislators
are already working to determine how states can collect taxes on bur-
geoning interstate mail-order and Internet sales.155 Opponents of the
Act maintain, moreover, that federal legislation to enforce state di-
rect-shipment restrictions will do little to prevent underage drinking
because “a minor ordering wine out-of-state by Internet or mail with
a credit card, then waiting for shipment . . . [is a] lot less likely than
snitching some from Mom and Dad’s supply, or with a bogus ID, or
from a surrogate buyer.”156 Representative Woosley characterized the
proposed legislation as “a wolf in sheep’s clothing,” accusing its sup-
porters of hiding behind claims of states’ rights and preventing teen-
agers from buying alcoholic beverages over the Internet, when their
real motive is appeasing liquor wholesalers and distributors that do
not want their three-tiered monopolies disrupted by direct sales.157
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Malmo, supra note 140, at B4 (“As in so many knee-jerk reactions by Con-
gress, this is just another lousy bill that restricts interstate commerce.”). It is interesting to note
that the most prominent supporters of the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act outside
of Congress are the organizations that represent state-sanctioned alcohol distribution monopo-
lies and oligopolies: the Wine and Spirits Wholesalers of America, the National Beer Wholesal-
ers Association, the National Licensed Beverage Association, and the National Alcohol Bever-
age Control Association. See 145 CONG. REC. S5344 (daily ed. May 14, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Byrd) (citing these organizations, in addition to the American Academy of Pediatrics and the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, as the organizations favoring the Twenty-first
Amendment Enforcement Act).
155. See Malmo, supra note 140, at B4.
156. Id.; see also Lisa Greim Everitt, Wine Online: Direct Shipments on Web Spur ‘Bootleg-
ging’ Debate, DENV. ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 27, 1999, at 1B (“Buying that $45 Amarone to
chug behind the high school with your friends takes a credit card, a three-to-seven-day wait and
‘lying multiple times. To go to the local store, you only gotta lie once.’”) (quoting Bill Newlands
of Virtual Vineyards, a California-based online wine retailer).
157. See 145 CONG. REC. H6863 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Woolsey). Rep-
resentative Woolsey characterized the three-tiered system of alcohol distribution that predomi-
nates state regulations as the result of three things: “Politics, policy, and profits.” Id.
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Realizing that the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act
had broad support in the House, however, one opponent, Represen-
tative Goodlatte, offered a telling amendment to the Act moments
before a vote was taken.158 The Goodlatte Amendment clarified that
the Twenty-first Amendment Enforcement Act would not permit
states to seek federal court injunctions to enforce state laws that dis-
criminate against out-of-state sellers in favor of local interests—laws
that amount to economic protectionism.159 The Amendment provided
that “[n]o State may enforce under this Act a law regulating the im-
portation or transportation of any intoxicating liquor that unconstitu-
tionally discriminates against interstate commerce by out-of-State
sellers by favoring local industries, thus erecting barriers to competi-
tion and constituting mere economic protectionism.”160 Representa-
tive Conyers noted that several Internet companies, including Amer-
ica Online, Bell Atlantic, Bell South, the Commercial Internet
Exchange, Prodigy, and PSInet, had expressed strong support for the
addition of the Goodlatte Amendment to the Twenty-first Amend-
ment Enforcement Act to make explicit that the Act would in no way
permit states to enforce protectionist state legislation in federal
court.161 The House voted overwhelmingly to include the Goodlatte
Amendment in their version of the Twenty-first Amendment En-
forcement Act, as both members who supported and who opposed
the Act argued that it was not “in anyway [sic] designed to supercede
158. See 145 CONG. REC. H6868 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
159. See 145 CONG. REC. H6869 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Cox) (co-
sponsoring the Goodlatte Amendment and clarifying that “States are free to regulate within
their boundaries the sale, distribution and production of alcoholic beverages produced and sold
elsewhere in order to promote temperance, in order to maintain their status as dry States or
even counties to be dry counties, to promote those social purposes behind the 21st amendment[,
but] a State cannot discriminate as mere economic protectionism against other sellers, other
producers in the rest of the United States”).
160. 145 CONG. REC. H6868 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
161. See 145 CONG. REC. H6871 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
Other Silicon Valley firms have also expressed concern that the Act might set a precedent of
allowing states to enforce discriminatory, protectionist legislation just as the growth of the
Internet promises to reshape interstate commerce. Intel, a very influential technology company,
wrote a letter to Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch expressing its desire to
have language similar to the Goodlatte Amendment included in the Senate version. See Carolyn
Lochhead, Threat to Internet Sales Uncorks New Alliance; Napa and Silicon Valleys Join To
Fight Wine Ban, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 18, 1999, at A1 (quoting Intel Vice President for Law and
Government Affairs F. Thomas Dunlap, Jr., who asserted in his letter to Senator Hatch that
“Intel, like other companies that are collectively building the new economy through the prod-
ucts and services which form the infrastructure of e-commerce, has a great stake in the preserva-
tion of an Internet free of discriminatory taxation and regulation”).
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any other provision of the Constitution, such as the first amendment
or the Commerce clause (including the so-called ‘dormant’ Com-
merce clause).”162 The House passed H.R. 2031, as amended, on
August 3, 1999.163
The Senate version of the Twenty-first Amendment Enforce-
ment Act was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on
the day it was proposed, March 10, 1999, and remained there until
March 2, 2000, when an amended version was reported by Senator
Hatch, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary.164 This amended
version of the Act contained new language similar to the Goodlatte
Amendment.165 If the Senate version passes, it would have to be rec-
onciled with the House version before the Twenty-first Amendment
Enforcement Act becomes law.
This discussion of the proposed Twenty-first Amendment En-
forcement Act sheds further light on the interplay between the
Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause for several rea-
sons. First, the congressional debates present the states’ principal ar-
guments in defense of restrictions on direct shipments—the need to
collect tax revenues on all sales of alcoholic beverages, concerns
about underage drinking, and enforcement of states’ three-tiered dis-
tribution systems. Second, the inclusion of language meant to ensure
that the Act would not be construed to limit the effect of the Com-
merce Clause in prohibiting discriminatory state laws indicates Con-
gress’s understanding that the states’ power to regulate direct ship-
ments of alcoholic beverages is subject to, and not free from, the
dormant Commerce Clause. Finally, this wave of federal action—ac-
tion taken under the powers conferred on Congress, at least in part,
by the Commerce Clause—suggests that the best balance between
162. 145 CONG. REC. H6871 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
163. See 145 CONG. REC. H6887 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999).
164. See 146 CONG. REC. S1117 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
165. See S. 577, 106th Cong. (2000). The relevant amendment to S. 577 provides:
Rules of Construction. This section shall be construed only to extend the jurisdiction
of Federal courts in connection with State law that is a valid exercise of power vested
in the States—
(1) under the twenty-first article of amendment of the Constitution of the
United States as such article of amendment is interpreted by the Supreme Court
of the United States including interpretations in conjunction with other provi-
sions of the Constitution of the United States; and
(2) under the first section herein as section such is interpreted by the Supreme
Court of the United States; but shall not be construed to grant to States any ad-
ditional power.
Id. § 2(e).
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states’ rights to regulate the liquor trade under the Twenty-first
Amendment and federal interests in protecting free interstate com-
merce may be reached through coordinated federal and state action.
VI.  A REASONABLE RESOLUTION TO THE DIRECT-SHIPMENT
DEBATE
Neither the plain meaning of the text of the Twenty-first
Amendment nor its legislative history resolves whether, and to what
extent, the Amendment created a dormant Commerce Clause excep-
tion for state regulations of commerce in alcoholic beverages. Careful
study of these sources reveals as much support for the narrow view
that section two of the Amendment was intended to have the very
limited effect of giving states the option to remain dry after repeal of
Prohibition as it does for the broad view that section two completely
exempted state regulation of commerce in intoxicating liquors from
other constitutional provisions.
While Supreme Court decisions have focused the range of possi-
bilities, even the Court’s jurisprudence interpreting the effect of sec-
tion two has evolved significantly. Immediately following ratification,
the Court repeatedly held that the Twenty-first Amendment permit-
ted states unfettered authority to regulate liquor traffic; more re-
cently, the Court has abandoned the notion that the Amendment cre-
ated a protective blanket for all state liquor laws in favor of a test that
balances states’ core powers under the Amendment with the dormant
Commerce Clause. The recent wave of Commerce Clause challenges
to state laws restricting direct shipments might soon present the Su-
preme Court with the opportunity to dispel the remaining uncer-
tainty. Among the federal courts that have reached the merits in these
recent challenges, a decidedly narrow interpretation of states’ powers
to regulate interstate commerce in alcoholic beverages has emerged.166
Whether these cases foretell of further narrowing of section two of
the Twenty-first Amendment by the Supreme Court remains to be
seen. What is evident from these challenges to state anti-direct-
shipment laws is that section two cannot be read as exempting even
state regulations of commerce in alcoholic beverages enacted under
“core powers” of the Twenty-first Amendment from the provisions of
the dormant Commerce Clause.
166. See supra Part III.C.
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Existing Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence, guided by ex-
amination of the text, the history, and even recent congressional de-
bate involving the Amendment, reveals sufficient room for a reason-
able solution to the interpretive dilemma—a solution that balances
state interests in regulating the peculiar threats that the liquor trade
poses to their citizens with federal concerns for preventing state-
created barriers to interstate trade. A few enlightened states have
moved their direct-shipment regulations toward this balance. These
states have enacted laws that permit direct shipment of alcoholic bev-
erages to consumers but incorporate more neutral safeguards that will
likely survive Commerce Clause scrutiny.167
Despite the shift in jurisprudence, the constitutional right of
states to regulate the manner of intrastate commercial liquor distribu-
tion is incontrovertible. Striking the necessary constitutional balance
between the dormant Commerce Clause, which makes interstate
commerce a uniquely federal concern, and the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, which makes at least intrastate regulation of alcoholic bever-
ages a uniquely state concern, requires a blending of legislative action
by both Congress and the states. Federal legislation is necessary to
regulate the interstate character of direct shipments, and state legisla-
tion is necessary to regulate the distribution of alcoholic beverages
once carried into the state.
An existing federal statute makes it a crime knowingly to ship
liquor in the United States in any package that is not clearly labeled
with the name of the consignee and the nature and quantity of its con-
tents.168 It is also a federal offense for any officer, agent, or employee
of a common carrier knowingly to deliver a shipment of liquor to any
person other than the person to whom the shipment has been con-
signed, unless upon written order of the consignee, or to any fictitious
person, or to any person under a fictitious name.169 These federal
criminal statutes shed a guiding light on the path that Congress and
the states should follow in reaching a reasonable and constitutional
resolution to the direct-shipment controversy. Congress, in collabora-
tion with the states, should supplement these federal criminal laws
with detailed regulations on wine and liquor producers that would be
at least as effective as face-to-face buyer/seller encounters at pre-
venting illegal sales of alcoholic beverages to minors. In a recent ses-
167. See supra Part IV.
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 1263 (1994).
169. See 18 U.S.C. § 1264 (1994).
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sion of Congress, Senator Feinstein proposed just such a set of
amendments to the existing federal criminal statutes concerning inter-
state shipment and delivery of alcoholic beverages.170 Essentially,
Senator Feinstein’s proposal would require that any shipping package
containing alcoholic beverages be clearly labeled as to the identifica-
tion of its contents and that, upon delivery, an adult who has attained
the age required by the state for lawful purchase and consumption of
alcoholic beverages present identification and sign for the shipment.171
Such a federal law, if enforced, would be as effective as face-to-face
sales in preventing access by minors to alcoholic beverages through
mail-order delivery.
To complement federal regulations of interstate shipments of al-
coholic beverages, states should enact regulations that explicitly pro-
scribe unlicensed distribution or sale of alcoholic beverages obtained
through lawful direct shipment. Of course, every state’s liquor control
laws already prohibit unlicensed retail sales of alcoholic beverages,
but directing similar regulations at direct shippers and consumers re-
ceiving direct shipments would make the applicability of these laws to
direct-shipping transactions explicit. If states deem simple prohibition
of unlicensed distribution of alcoholic beverages obtained through di-
rect shipment insufficient to protect their interests, limiting the legal
quantity of alcoholic beverages that an individual may purchase out-
side of the state’s three-tier distribution system, as several states have
done,172 would likely survive dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny as a
valid exercise of “core” powers.173 Such laws, while still discriminating
against interstate commerce in that they limit consumer access to
some out-of-state wines and limit market access by many out-of-state
wine producers, should be defensible under the Twenty-first
Amendment as the least discriminatory means of exercising core
Twenty-first Amendment powers. Quantity limitations would permit
state residents to purchase wines from out-of-state wineries whose
products are not available through the state-regulated distribution
system and would also serve the state’s interest in ensuring that direct
shipments would not foster illegal channels of distribution, would not
170. See 145 CONG. REC. S5345 (daily ed. May 14, 1999) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
171. See id. (introducing Amendment No. 354 to the proposed Violent and Repeat Juvenile
Offender Accountability and Rehabilitation Act of 1999).
172. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
173. See supra Part IV.
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undermine state efforts to promote temperance, and would not in-
crease access by minors to alcoholic beverages.
CONCLUSION
While absolute proscription of interstate commerce in alcoholic
beverages that are not distributed through a state’s three-tiered dis-
tribution system smacks of commercial protectionism, particularly in
those states that permit alcoholic beverages manufactured in-state to
be purchased and shipped to residents without passing through the
three-tiered system, states do have legitimate concerns in preventing
unrestricted distribution of alcoholic beverages and the right to exer-
cise core powers conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment. Thus, as
the Supreme Court has intimated in its modern Twenty-first
Amendment jurisprudence, and lower federal courts have found ex-
plicitly in recent challenges to anti-direct-shipping laws, the states
must find that level of regulation of commerce in alcoholic beverages
where they are able to protect the core powers reserved to them by
the Amendment while minimally imposing on interstate commerce.
State legislation permitting direct shipment of alcoholic beverages in
limited quantities combined with federal legislation regulating trans-
portation and delivery of alcoholic beverages by common carriers will
effectively balance federal interests in unrestricted interstate com-
merce and state interests in protecting the health and welfare of their
citizens from the dangers of an unrestricted liquor trade. Only a com-
plementary set of federal and state direct-shipment regulations such
as these can pass constitutional scrutiny while permitting states to use
their core powers under the Twenty-first Amendment.
